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Introduction 
 The philosophy of science has much to contribute to the formulation of public policy. 
Contemporary policy making draws heavily on scientific information, whether it be about the 
safety and effectiveness of medical treatments, the pros and cons of different economic policies, 
the severity of environmental problems, or the best strategies for alleviating inequality and other 
social problems. When science becomes relevant to public policy, however, it often becomes 
highly politicized, and figures on opposing sides of the political spectrum draw on opposing 
bodies of scientific information to support their preferred conclusions.1 One has only to look at 
contemporary debates over climate change, vaccines, and genetically modified foods to see how 
these debates over science can complicate policy making.2 
 When science becomes embroiled in policy debates, questions arise about who to trust 
and how to evaluate the quality of the available scientific evidence. For example, historians have 
identified a number of cases where special interest groups sought to influence policy by 
amplifying highly questionable scientific claims about public-health and environmental issues 
like tobacco smoking, climate change, and industrial pollution.3 Determining how best to 
respond to these efforts is a very important question that cuts across multiple disciplines. One 
does not want to be too quick to stifle dissenting views, because dissent can sometimes play a 
valuable role in correcting misconceptions and promoting scientific progress.4 Nevertheless, 
there are clearly cases where special-interest groups have hampered good policy making by 
manipulating science in unacceptable ways.5 Moreover, even when no one is deliberately 
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attempting to manipulate or misrepresent research, the inherent uncertainty involved in most 
environmental research can make it very difficult to decide how to handle disagreements 
between different scientists and policy makers. 
 Philosophers of science have recently performed a good deal of work that can help 
promote better policy making in the face of these challenges. In fact, the philosophy of science 
has recently seen a proliferation of scholarly societies, books, journal articles, and special issues 
dedicated to public policy and more general questions about how the field can be socially 
engaged.6 This chapter focuses specifically on issues related to environmental research and 
policy as an illustration of three ways in which the philosophy of science can benefit policy 
making. First, it can help clarify the roles that values play in policy-relevant science. Second, it 
can help guide decision makers in evaluating and addressing scientific dissent, especially in 
response to controversial policy issues. Third, it can help guide thoughtful policy responses to 
scientific uncertainty.  
 
Science and Values 
One of the important ways in which the philosophy of science can contribute to better 
policy making is by clarifying the roles that values play in policy-relevant scientific research. It 
has been common in policy contexts to draw a relatively sharp distinction between facts and 
values, with the idea that science supplies policy makers with relatively straightforward facts, 
and the preferences of the public or their government representatives supply values. An example 
of this distinction in the context of environmental research is the distinction employed by the 
U.S. government between risk assessment and risk management.7 Traditionally, risk assessment 
has been regarded as a fairly straightforward scientific process of determining the probability 
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that particular hazards will cause specific health effects at the levels to which people are 
exposed. In contrast, risk management has been regarded as a value-laden process of deciding 
whether or not those health effects are tolerable and what to do about them, given the range of 
social costs and benefits associated with them.8  
This effort to keep policy-relevant science free of values has turned out to be more 
difficult than it initially appears. One can begin to appreciate the difficulties by looking at the 
process of risk assessment for toxic chemicals. It turns out that in order to produce a risk 
assessment, scientists have to make a host of judgments that are not settled by the available 
evidence.9 For example, they typically test toxic chemicals on animals like rats, and they have to 
make choices about how to extrapolate from the effects on the rats to the effects that are likely to 
occur in humans. They also typically test the chemicals at relatively high doses, which means 
they have to estimate how the effects will change at lower doses. They also have to estimate how 
the effects will vary on pregnant women or children or other particularly sensitive individuals. In 
addition, risk assessors often encounter some studies that appear to show that a chemical is toxic 
at particular dose levels and others that appear to show that it is not toxic at those levels. In these 
cases, they have to make additional judgments about which studies to trust. All these judgments 
are “value-laden,” in the sense that they are not settled by the available evidence but can have a 
major impact on the outcome of a risk assessment. Thus, even if scientists do not intend to 
support some social values over others when they make these judgments, they are ultimately 
forced to do so.10        
 The philosophy of science can make a valuable contribution to public policy by clarifying 
the range of “decision points” where value-laden judgments arise in policy-relevant science. I 
have previously argued that there are at least five decision points that are important to consider: 
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(1) choices about research topics; (2) decisions about what questions to ask regarding those 
topics; (3) choices about the aims of inquiry, which determine what count as adequate answers to 
the questions being asked; (4) decisions about standards of evidence for drawing conclusions; 
and (5) choices about how to describe and frame scientific findings.11  
Philosophers have highlighted a number of ways in which environmental research is 
affected by values at these decision points. For example, in accordance with the second decision 
point mentioned above, Hugh Lacey has pointed out that risk assessments of emerging 
technologies tend to focus on examining some questions about their effects (e.g., potential 
human health effects or environmental effects) while ignoring other questions (e.g., their social 
or economic effects).12 As a result, the risk-assessment process can look very objective while still 
being significantly value-laden. In accordance with the fourth decision point, a number of 
philosophers have emphasized that judges and regulators are forced to make ethically significant 
choices about how much evidence and what kinds of evidence to demand before concluding that 
potential environmental threats are likely to occur.13 In accordance with the fifth decision point, I 
have argued that even the terms and categories used for describing environmental issues can 
affect public perceptions of them in ways that are socially significant.14 Debates about 
terminology have occurred in a wide range of environmental contexts, including climate change, 
invasive species, endocrine disruption, genetic modification, climate geoengineering, and many 
others.15  
Once these sorts of value judgments have been clarified, it becomes possible to scrutinize 
and critique them. In some cases, it might be desirable for scientists to try to avoid making the 
value judgments so that they could be handled by policy makers instead.16 In other cases, it 
might be sufficient for the scientists to clarify the value judgments that they made so that others 
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could consider whether or not they agree with them.17 In still other cases, scientists might be able 
to collaborate with policy makers and other stakeholders to decide how to make important 
judgments.18 However one chooses to respond to these value judgments, the goal is to develop a 
better understanding of how they influence the science that informs policy decisions.       
  
Scientific Dissent 
A second way in which the philosophy of science can contribute to policy making is by 
helping to navigate scientific dissent. A pervasive feature of policy-relevant science, especially 
environmental science, is the presence of disagreement. In some cases, such as climate-change 
denial, it is fairly clear that one side of the debate is inappropriately raising bogus objections or 
misrepresenting the available evidence.19 In many cases, however, there are legitimate questions 
about how to interpret the available scientific evidence. For example, the scientific community 
has been debating the human health effects of bisphenol A (BPA) for more than a decade.20 BPA 
is used in a wide variety of products, including can liners and cash-register receipts, but it 
appears to act as an endocrine disruptor, which means that it can potentially cause health 
problems by interfering with the endocrine system. While many academic studies have suggested 
that BPA has the potential to harm human health at the levels to which people are currently 
exposed, important studies of BPA performed by the chemical industry have not indicated that it 
is harmful.21 As a result, major regulatory agencies in the United States and the European Union 
have been slow to regulate it.22    
In response to these sorts of cases, it might be tempting to try to squelch scientific dissent 
and strive for consensus. Nevertheless, philosophers of science have pointed out that there are 
significant dangers to doing so.23 As we have seen, policy-relevant science is invariably value-
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laden, and it is often difficult to distinguish value judgments that are reasonable from those that 
are problematic. In response to this difficulty, a number of philosophers have argued that 
scientific objectivity is most likely to be secured by fostering critical interaction between people 
with varying perspectives so that they can uncover implicit value judgments and subject them to 
adequate scrutiny.24 On this account, dissent is central to maintaining scientific objectivity. 
Moreover, Inma de Melo-Martin and Kristen Intemann have emphasized that dissent can 
promote scientific progress by ensuring that a wide range of research projects, explanations, and 
assumptions all receive adequate attention.25 They note that dissent can also strengthen 
consensus views by ensuring that they have been thoroughly examined, and this in turn can 
strengthen public trust in science. 
Given that dissent can be problematic in some circumstances but beneficial in other 
contexts, philosophers of science have recently proposed a variety of criteria for distinguishing 
appropriate and inappropriate dissent. For example, Justin Biddle and Anna Leuschner have 
argued that dissent is problematic if the non-epistemic consequences of wrongly rejecting a 
scientific claim are significant, if the dissent violates established epistemic standards, if the 
dissent promotes public risks over producer risks, and if producer risks and public risks fall on 
different parties.26 This account makes it clear why dissent about climate change appears to be 
problematic. Wrongly rejecting climate change is likely to have dire consequences, and those 
who question the evidence for climate change appear to be depending on false and misleading 
arguments. Moreover, the major effects of climate change fall particularly heavily on the public, 
including groups that are already disadvantaged, while the costs of responding to climate change 
are particularly salient to corporations that produce or depend on energy from fossil fuels. 
7 
 
Unfortunately, while Biddle and Leuschner’s account of problematic dissent may be 
helpful in some cases, it does not appear to be fully adequate. Specifically, de Melo-Martin and 
Intemann have argued that it can be very difficult to determine whether the criteria proposed by 
Biddle and Leuschner have been met.27 For example, there is often room for disagreement about 
which epistemic standards are legitimate and how to interpret them. In addition, there are often a 
wide range of consequences associated with dissenting scientific views, which means that it can 
be difficult to decide whether producer risks are actually being prioritized over public risks. De 
Melo-Martin and Intemann argue that the difficulties faced by Biddle and Leuschner are typical 
of most efforts to develop criteria for distinguishing appropriate and inappropriate dissent; in the 
thick of scientific debate, it is difficult to apply the criteria successfully.28    
Instead of depending on a set of criteria, de Melo-Martin and Intemann recommend 
shifting attention away from dissent and focusing instead on fostering scientific institutions that 
engender public trust.29 They argue that when the public has trust in scientific institutions, 
special-interest groups will find it much more difficult to wield dissent as an excuse for resisting 
well-supported scientific conclusions. By alleviating the problematic consequences of dissent, 
they suggest that it becomes less important to try to draw sharp distinctions between appropriate 
and inappropriate forms of dissent. De Melo-Martin and Intemann suggest a variety of strategies 
for promoting greater trust, including the development of better approaches for addressing 
conflicts of interest and preventing scientific misconduct.30 
Another strategy for productively addressing scientific dissent is to formulate public 
policies in strategic ways that do not depend too heavily on detailed scientific information. 
Science policy scholars have pointed out that in polarized political contexts, those on opposite 
sides of political debates are likely to wield science as a strategic tool for strengthening their 
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positions.31 As a result, it is very difficult to resolve political disputes using science; when 
science is brought into these disputes, it is likely to become sucked into the political debates. 
Therefore, it is often most productive to develop creative regulatory and policy strategies that 
can alleviate political debates without depending too heavily on detailed scientific information.32   
 
Responding to Uncertainty 
A third way in which the philosophy of science, and the field of philosophy more 
broadly, can contribute to thoughtful policy making is by providing guidance for responding to 
scientific uncertainty. Environmental policy making in particular is plagued by uncertainty, and 
philosophers have made important contributions to thinking about how to respond to this 
problem. Three concepts in particular have played an important role in recent philosophical work 
on this issue: inductive risk, the precautionary principle, and argumentative analysis. 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, one of the important value judgments that scientists 
and policy makers need to make when addressing uncertainty in policy-relevant research is to 
decide what standards of evidence to demand before drawing conclusions.33 This value judgment 
arises because scientists always face inductive risk, which is the possibility that their inferences 
will end up being incorrect.34 Philosophers of science have recently spilled a great deal of ink 
reflecting on how scientists and policy makers can respond to inductive risk in a responsible 
fashion.35 Some have argued that scientists should strive to hedge their conclusions so carefully 
that their claims become relatively certain and free of inductive risk.36 Others have argued that 
this effort to avoid uncertainty is unrealistic, and scientists should instead weigh the costs and 
benefits of drawing false-positive or false-negative errors when setting standards of evidence.37 
For example, if the costs of drawing a false-positive error were particularly low and the costs of 
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drawing a false-negative error were especially high in a particular context, it might make sense 
for scientists to lower their standards of evidence so that they would be less likely to make a 
false-negative error.  
Deciding how to perform this weighing process in a responsible manner raises a number 
of additional questions. Some have argued that scientists should, if at all possible, merely express 
the probability that particular conclusions are true and then let policy makers decide whether or 
not to accept those conclusions.38 Others have argued that scientists should choose a fixed 
standard of evidence so that the public is less likely to become confused about the amount of 
confidence that scientists have in their conclusions.39 Still others argue that scientists can adjust 
their standards of evidence in different contexts, depending on the social consequences of 
making particular sorts of mistakes, as long as they are sufficiently transparent about the 
standards of evidence that they are choosing.40 Another approach is to promote as much 
engagement as possible between scientists, policy makers, and other stakeholders so that they 
can decide how to respond to inductive risk in a collaborative fashion.41          
Another way in which philosophers have assisted in addressing uncertainty in policy-
relevant science—and specifically uncertainty about environmental threats—is by clarifying the 
concept of the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle calls on decision makers to 
address uncertainty by taking precautionary measures to address serious or irreversible threats 
even when the scientific information about those threats is limited.42 The precautionary principle 
has been the subject of intense debate, with some commentators arguing that it is a matter of 
common sense and others arguing that it is a paralyzing principle that is impossible to follow.43 
Philosophers have clarified that at least some of this confusion can be traced to ambiguity about 
at least three aspects of the principle: (1) the types of threats that should trigger the principle; (2) 
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the amount of scientific information required in order to justify taking precautionary measures; 
and (3) the types of precautionary actions that should be taken.44 Critics of the principle tend to 
interpret it so that it requires dramatic steps to prevent potential threats, even if there is very little 
evidence that they will occur, while proponents of the principle tend to interpret it in much more 
reasonable ways.  
The precautionary principle is also sometimes used in an even broader range of ways, 
referring to practices like setting goals for reducing the use of hazardous substances, shifting the 
burden of proof onto polluters to show that their activities are safe, carefully examining 
alternatives to potentially hazardous activities, and incorporating public participation in assessing 
and managing risks.45 Clarifying these different interpretations of the precautionary principle 
does not resolve all disputes about it; there are still important ethical disagreements about 
whether particular interpretations of it provide good guidance for handling uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, conceptual clarification can at least help prevent people from talking past each 
other and instead promote fruitful discussion of these ethical disagreements.   
Finally, philosophers have also been contributing to better policy making under 
uncertainty by employing what Sven Ove Hansson and Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn have called 
“argumentative analysis.”46 Hansson and Hirsch Hadorn argue that policy making has been 
dominated by formal, technical methods such as risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis, but that 
these methods are problematic in cases where there is so much uncertainty that it is difficult to 
assign precise probabilities and consequences to the actions under consideration.47 They argue 
that argumentative analysis can be employed by philosophers to accomplish a number of tasks: 
to better understand the uncertainties involved in decisions, to prioritize among 
uncertain dangers, to determine how decisions should be framed, to clarify how 
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different decisions on interconnected subject-matter relate to each other, to choose a 
suitable time frame for decision-making, to analyse [sic] the ethical aspects of a 
decision, to systematically choose among different decision options, and not least to 
improve our communication with other decision-makers in order to co-ordinate our 
decisions.48 
 Argumentative analysis has much to offer environmental policy making, where 
uncertainty is ubiquitous. Consider climate geoengineering, which consists of the deliberate 
manipulation of earth systems, especially in response to climate change.49 Some scientists have 
suggested that we could cool the planet using techniques like shooting sulfur aerosols into the 
atmosphere or stimulating the growth of ocean plankton in order to absorb carbon dioxide.50 In 
the face of massive uncertainty about the consequences of choosing whether or not to employ 
these techniques, formal methods for decision analysis face significant challenges. Faced with 
these difficulties, philosophers have explored the strengths and weaknesses of different ways of 
framing decisions about geoengineering, such as by regarding it as a form of insurance or as a 
technical fix.51 They have also explored ethical questions, such as whether it would be 
problematic to alter nature in such a significant way, or whether geoengineering poses a “moral 
hazard,” or whether it can be justified as the “lesser of two evils.”52 Finally, they have 
investigated procedural questions about what form of public consent, if any, would be needed in 
order to justify engaging in climate geoengineering.53 Cases like this one illustrate that 
argumentative analysis need not be limited to philosophers of science. Ethicists, political 
philosophers, and decision theorists also have much to contribute, but the philosophy of science 





 This chapter has explored three ways in which the philosophy of science can contribute to 
better policy making, especially with respect to environmental issues. First, the philosophy of 
science can help to clarify the roles that values play in policy-relevant science. Second, it can 
help guide policy makers in evaluating and responding to dissenting scientific views. Third, it 
can help guide decision making in response to scientific uncertainty. 
 Of course, philosophers of science who want to contribute to public policy still have a 
great deal of work to do. Even though scholars now have a more sophisticated understanding of 
the roles that values play in policy-relevant science, there is still a great deal of confusion about 
the conditions under which particular influences of values are appropriate and the best ways to 
achieve transparency about those value influences. Similar confusion surrounds the conditions 
under which scientific dissent is appropriate and the best ways of responding to dissent. And 
even though philosophers have helped to clarify a number of issues involved in formulating 
policy under scientific uncertainty, it remains an extremely difficult topic that merits much more 
work.  
As philosophers continue to address these questions, they also need to reflect on the best 
ways to make their work useful and available to the policy community. This may require 
collaborating on research projects with scholars from outside philosophy, publishing in a range 
of journals and other venues that engage more diverse audiences, and altering professional 
incentives so that philosophers are rewarded for performing these activities. By being creative 
both about the nature of their work and how they share it with broader communities, 
philosophers of science will hopefully achieve their goal of performing effective, socially 
engaged scholarship.  
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